More than 1.5 billion students experienced disruption to education as a result of COVID-19, representing the most substantial interruption to global education in modern history. Many educational institutions transitioned to emergency remote teaching (ERT) overnight, which has presented an array of distinct challenges for educators. Using virtual interviews and an experiential approach to thematic analysis, the study examined Scottish primary teachers’ (n = 10) lived experiences of adapting to ERT practice. Findings demonstrated three main themes; ‘Meeting Learners’ Needs,’ ‘Influencing Engagement’, (...) and ‘The Impact of ERT on Teachers’. Key findings suggested that differentiating learning, engaging, and communicating with learners is more difficult during ERT than face-to-face teaching. Parental engagement is vital, however, is influenced by several mitigating factors. Finally, ERT is likely to have substantial effects on the wellbeing of those involved. Implications of these findings are considered and discussed. (shrink)

© 2016 Regents of the University of California.The Review summarizes much of particle physics and cosmology. Using data from previous editions, plus 3,062 new measurements from 721 papers, we list, evaluate, and average measured properties of gauge bosons and the recently discovered Higgs boson, leptons, quarks, mesons, and baryons. We summarize searches for hypothetical particles such as supersymmetric particles, heavy bosons, axions, dark photons, etc. All the particle properties and search limits are listed in Summary Tables. We also give numerous (...) tables, figures, formulae, and reviews of topics such as Higgs Boson Physics, Supersymmetry, Grand Unified Theories, Neutrino Mixing, Dark Energy, Dark Matter, Cosmology, Particle Detectors, Colliders, Probability and Statistics. Among the 117 reviews are many that are new or heavily revised, including those on Pentaquarks and Inflation. The complete Review is published online in a journal and on the website of the Particle Data Group. The printed PDG Book contains the Summary Tables and all review articles but no longer includes the detailed tables from the Particle Listings. A Booklet with the Summary Tables and abbreviated versions of some of the review articles is also available. (shrink)

Do contemporary big-budget blockbuster films like Gravity move something in us that is fundamentally the same as what avant-garde and experimental films have done for more than a century? In a powerful challenge to mainstream film theory, Cinema's Bodily Illusions demonstrates that this is the case. Scott C. Richmond bridges genres and periods by focusing, most palpably, on cinema's power to evoke illusions: feeling like you're flying through space, experiencing 3D without glasses, or even hallucinating. He argues that cinema (...) is, first and foremost, a technology to modulate perception. He presents a theory of cinema as a proprioceptive technology: cinema becomes art by modulating viewers' embodied sense of space. It works primarily not at the level of the intellect but at the level of the body. Richmond develops his theory through examples of direct perceptual illusion in cinema: hallucinatory flicker phenomena in Tony Conrad's The Flicker, eerie depth effects in Marcel Duchamp's Anémic Cinéma, the illusion of bodily movement through onscreen space in Stanley Kubrick's 2001, Godfrey Reggio's Koyaanisqatsi, and Alfonso Cuarón's Gravity. In doing so he combines insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and James J. Gibson's ecological approach to perception. The result is his distinctive ecological phenomenology, which allows us to refocus on the cinema's perceptual, rather than representational, power. Arguing against modernist habits of mind in film theory and aesthetics, and the attendant proclamations of cinema's death or irrelevance, Richmond demonstrates that cinema's proprioceptive aesthetics make it an urgent site of contemporary inquiry. (shrink)

The first amounts, roughly, to "It is necessarily the case that any President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S." But the second says, "the person who in fact is the President of the U.S, has the property of necessarily being a citizen of the U.S," Thus, while (2) is clearly true, it would be reasonable to consider (3) false.

The prevalence of optimality models in the literature of evolutionary biology is testimony to their popularity and importance. Evolutionary biologist R. C. Lewontin, whose criticisms of optimality models are considered here, reflects that "optimality arguments have become extremely popular in the last fifteen years, and at present represent the dominant mode of thought." Although optimality models have received little attention in the philosophical literature, these models are very interesting from a philosophical point of view. As will be argued, optimality models (...) are central to evolutionary thought, yet they are not readily accomodated by the traditional view of scientific theories. According to the traditional view, we would expect optimality models to employ general, empirical laws of nature, but they do not. Fortunately, the semantic view of scientific theories, a recent alternative to the traditional view, more readily accomodates optimality models. As we would expect on the semantic view, optimality models can be construed as specifications of ideal systems. These specifications may be used to describe empirical systems--that is, the specifications may have empirical instances. But the specifications are not empirical claims, much less general, empirical laws. Although philosophers have yet to discuss the general features and uses of optimality models, these topics have stimulated much recent discussion among evolutionary biologists. Their discussions raise a number of precautions concerning the proper use of optimality models. Moreover, many of their caveats can be interpreted as general reminders that 1) optimality models specify ideal systems whose empirical instantiations may be quite restricted, and that 2) optimality models should not be construed as general, empirical laws. As G. F. Oster and E. O. Wilson caution, "the prudent course is to regard optimality models as provisional guides to further empirical research and not necessarily as the key to deeper laws of nature." It seems, then, that the semantic view of theories is more sensitive to the nature and limitations of optimality models than is the more traditional view of theories. (shrink)

In an issue of Common Knowledge given over to experiments in scholarly form and to the discussion of them, this piece is one of three on the genre of microhistory. The other two argue the merits and demerits of the genre, while this piece seeks to exemplify both its virtues and its risks. To show how microhistory offers intense deliberation on a narrowly defined topic, yet also a kind of hastiness — an impatience with demands for broader scope — Colin (...) Richmond examines one limited facet of the relationship between two Americans resident in England at the turn of the last century: the novelist Henry James and the painter Edwin Austin Abbey. Detailed evidence is mustered to document James's love of fresh hens' eggs and of the undignified lengths he would go to obtain them through the agency of Abbey and his wife. This short piece is written as if a parable, and while its moral goes unstated, the reader's attention is drawn to the unsettled question of whether James exerted maximal effort for minimal results, or whether he knew something about the value of freshness undreamed of by those more patient and dignified in pursuing their desires. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69. DID BEATTIE DEFER TO HUME? Robert Paul Wolff, in his essay, "Kant's Debt to Hume Via Beattie," points out a 'rather interesting mistake ' made by Norman Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kànt's Critique of Pure Reason. In the Commentary Kemp Smith considers the similarities of the respective theories of self of Kant and Hume and finds it intriguing that the two philosophers agree"...that there is no (...) single empirical« 2 state of the self which is constant throughout experience". In spite of this agreement of doctrine Kemp Smith insists Kant must have arrived at his conclusions independently of any reading of Hume. We are told this is so because "Hume's view of the self is not developed in the Enquiry, and is 3 not mentioned by Beattie". And since, as Kemp Smith argues, Kant had only the Enquiry and certain passages of Hume's Treatise as quoted by James Beattie in An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth available to him, this agreement must be considered an accident rather than evidence of an 4 influence of Hume on Kant. Here then is the 'interesting mistake'. Wolff does not wish to dispute the more or less canonical assessment that Kant's knowledge of Hume rested on first hand acquaintance with the Enquiry and Beattie' s Essay rather than the Treatise. However, Wolff does want to question Kemp Smith's account of how much Hume Kant could have gleaned from Beattie. Kemp Smith tells us that in the Essay Beattie says nothing of Hume's theory of self. But as every reader of the Essay knows Beattie spent no less than six pages on Hume's discussion of self and personality, and considered it very important: at least important enough that he seems to have felt that a mere description of Hume on the self would serve as a reductio on the Humean body of beliefs. Still, according to Wolff, what appears to be a mistake made by Kemp Smith turns out not to be one at all. Wolff infers from the 1776 date of Beattie' s Essay which 70. Kemp Smith cites that he was working from the sixth edition, the edition which Beattie, responding to Hume's attempt in the Advertisement for the Enquiries to deny responsibility for the Treatise, "...altered his discussion of Hume's philosophy so that his criticism would not apply to the Treatise alone". Such an alteration of the Essay meant, according to Wolff, making the topics of the Essay line up in number and content with those of the Hume's Enquiry. But as we all know Hume does not discuss personal identity in the Enquiry. Thus this topic is omitted from the sixth edition of Beattie's Essay. And thus Kemp Smith's "mistake" turns out not to be one at all. Even if this dissolution by Wolff of what appears to be a mistake by Kemp Smith were correct we would still have puzzles to contend with. For example, the discussion of causation in the Enquiry has long been recognized to differ? significantly from that of the Treatise. One would then expect that Wolff would also cite some change in the sixth edition of the Essay on this score. Yet Wolff does not mention any alteration in the sixth edition account of causation, and in fact a comparison of the relevant sections of the sixth with an earlier edition will not yield any significant difference in the texts. But, be this as it may, where before we had one seeming mistake and the promise of its being dissolved, we now have two strange mistakes both irresolvable. For the discussion of Hume on personal identity which Wolff and Kemp Smith say does not occur in the edition of Beattie's Essay of 1776 is really there, substantially unchanged from earlier editions. For the sake of completeness it should be noted also that even though Wolff refers only to the sixth edition printed in 1776 there are also at least three other printings of the sixth edition (in 1777, 1778 and 1805), but this makes little difference since Beattie's treatment of the topic of personal identity... (shrink)

Around 1998, internet postings began appearing under the alias ‘ Timetravel_0 ’. This alias was later replaced by ‘John Titor’, and it's as such I'll designate the posts' author. Remarkably, Titor claimed to have time-travelled from 2036 on a mission to retrieve an IBM 5100 in 1975. Titor refrained from public appearances and any evidence for his story remains web-bound but before closing shop c. March 24 th 2001, he described various future events, e.g.: Y2K is a disaster. Many people (...) die on the highways when they freeze to death trying to get to warmer weather. Cancellation of the Olympics after 2004 due to world conflict. America will soon be engaged in civil war with itself; a civil war that we'll see the beginnings of during 2004 and 2005, escalating until it is indisputable by 2008. This equivocal civil war fizzles until global nuclear war kills three billion people in 2015. (shrink)

This article discusses whether and how globalization has had a significant effect on Australia, by referencing normative concepts of good or bad, of presence or absence and whether normative truth questions can be asked. These questions are answered by employing Bhaskar’s most recent iteration of the RRREI(C) schema for explanatory analysis. Viewed generally, the essential or necessary component of globalization is the ideology of neo-liberalism from which has emerged the more radical neo-conservatism. Overall these ideologies, which underpin globalization, are having (...) a detrimental effect economically and socially: economically because of widening wealth inequalities both in Australia and globally; and socially because of growing push for protectionism in wealthier countries like Australia. These emerging social and economic ontologically real phenomena are causing consternation and fuelling divisiveness worldwide. Nevertheless, by conducting this explanatory analysis, we were able to identify feasible interventions that would, if implemented, possibly absent the negative aspects of globalization. (shrink)

The relationship between time and voice about unethical behaviour has been highlighted as a key area for exploration within the voice and silence field (Morrison Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior 10:79–107, 2023). Previous studies have made only modest progress in this area, so we present a temporal lens which can act as a guide for others wishing to better understand the role of time and voice. Applying the concept of theory adaptation (Jaakkola AMS Review 10:18–26, 2020), a (...) method which attempts to build on a given field through the application of a new theoretical lens, we begin by reviewing what is known in relation to voice about unethical behaviour specifically. Then we introduce two temporal frameworks, one suggested by Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow (Ancona et al. The Academy of Management Review 26:645–663, 2001a; Ancona et al. The Academy of Management Review 26:512–529, 2001b) as a useful way of analysing time in organisations, and a second one by Bansal, Anna, and Wood, (Bansal et al. Academy of Management Review 43:217–241, 2018) focusing on the way organisations include voice into their temporal rhythm. We then draw conclusions about the role of time in relation to voice about unethical behaviour and identify three insights; a) it takes time for voices to generate evidence for unethical behaviour, b) perceptions of unethical behaviour change over time, and c) it is most difficult to voice about unethical behaviour at the time it is most needed. Our recommendations for future avenues of research based on these insights recommend new research designs better suited to explore the relationship between voice and time and a focus on how the formality of voice mechanisms shapes the timing of voice. (shrink)

This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.

The author here extends a dialogue with Jeffrey M. Perl, published in the Spring 2010 issue of Common Knowledge, under the title “`Decorate the Dungeon.'” That dialogue concerns whether Thomas More could have avoided martyrdom though he acted with heroic quietism during the Henrician Reformation. Dubious of this premise during the previous exchange, the author here examines the lives of three northern English quietists of More's time—Christopher Urswick (c. 1448–1552), Cuthbert Tunstall (1474–1559), and John Redman (1499–1551)—who never quite risked martyrdom (...) but never abandoned their own principles either. This essay concludes that Tunstall was the most heroic of the three. As a bishop (for well over thirty years), he could have burned heretics in the 1530s and 1550s but he sent no one to death—a record perhaps better than that of Thomas More, who saw sedition in some of those brought before him as heretics when he was chancellor. A record so free of violent commitment as Tunstall's was extraordinary in his time, as in ours, and this article gives it due recognition. (shrink)

Miss Gertrude Hirst's article on Aeneid VII.in the April number, 1916, of the C.Q. depends for its cogency upon dates in Propertius. Not wishing that her careful work should be vitiated by premisses which may shortly be proved false, I venture to set out the bare results of my own researches in this field of dates, results which have stood the test of several years of further examination.

Hugh Everett’s “Universal Wave Theory Formulation of Quantum Mechanics”, though endorsed and promoted by his mentor John Wheeler, was dismissed by the mainstream in quantum mechanics. Why was it sidelined by those who endorsed the Copenhagen interpretation and John von Neumann’s approach to the famous measurement problem? Everett’s theory was taken up later by Bryce DeWitt under an interpretation, the many worlds universe theory, that is not actually how Everett interpreted his own formulation. I argue that by looking at science (...) as a social institution according to Ian C. Jarvie’s critique of Karl Popper’s view of science as a “Republic,” we can see how Everett was sidelined: external pressures of the Cold War and McCarthy and internal pressures of Big Science and the “military-industrial complex.”. (shrink)

Mr.Mitford has kindly provided me with a photograph and impression of a Cyprian text of uncertain provenance, which he assigns to the fifth or fourth century B.C. An account of the text has been published by Mr. Mitford in Minos, VI. i , 37–47. I print below my interpretation, which differs in some respects from his. The characters on the stone are for the most part clearly legible, and even where there is damage to the surface of the stone restoration (...) is practically certain. (shrink)

Mr. Bishop's article in C.Q., xlix . 187–92 on Palatine Apollo calls for an answer from me, since I am still alive to give it, though my own study dates from 1910 and was published in J.R.S. for 1914, pp. 193–226. So far away is this publication, and my offprints have for so long been exhausted, that scholars of my generation need to go to university libraries to refer to it, and recent generations do not know it at all. From (...) Lugli's book on Rome they do not gather the details which convinced Boni that I was right, because he omitted some of the most cogent from mention. (shrink)

SummaryThe main question of this paper is — how do representational pictures convey information? I argue: 1) This question is approached from three opposing metaphysical frameworks. a) Monism answers this question by treating representational pictures as a species of cognitive symbolism. b) Polarism answers this question by sharply distinguishing between natural symbolism and languages; and, between symbolism and reality — representational pictures are natural symbols, mimics of reality. c) Pluralism treats pictures as occupying a mid‐point between the scales of reality (...) /illusion, knowledge/deception — representational pictures are quasi‐symbolic simulations. 2) The occurrence of institutionalized deception , the game of creating/having false visual hypotheses without the making of false intellectual hypotheses — undermines monism and polarism. Consequently, 3) the pluralist approach — we gain information on the intellectual plane by the use of perceptual deception — is the most promising for explaining how representational pictures convey information.RésuméLa question principale dont s'occupe cet article est »Comment les images représentatives transmettent de l'information?« Mon argumentation: 1) Cette question est abordée dans trois cadres métaphysiques opposés: a) le monisme répond à cette question en la traitant comme une variété de symbolisme cognitif; b) le polarisme y répond en distinguant strictement entre le symbolisme naturel et les langages et entre le symbolisme et la réalité— les images représentatives sont des symboles naturels, des imitations de la réalité; c) le pluralisme traite les images comme occupant un point médian entre les échelles »realité/illusion«, »connaissance/erreur«. Les images représentatives sont des simulations quasi‐symboliques. 2) L'existence de »tromperies institutionalisées« , le jeu consistant á créer/avoir des hypothèses visuelles fausses sans faire des hypothèses intellectuelles fausses, condamnent le monisme et le polarisme. Par conséquent 3) l'approche pluraliste constitue la voie la plus prometteuse pour expliquer comment les images représentatives apportent de I'information.ZusammenfassungDie Hauptfrage, die in dem vorliegenden Aufsatz behandelt wird, ist die, wie repräsentationale Bilder Information vermitteln. Meine Argumentation lautet: 1.) Die Frage wird von drei entgegengesetzten metaphysischen Standpunkten her angegangen. a) Der Monismus beantwortet die Frage, indem er repräsentationale Bilder als eine Art von kognitiven Symbolen behandelt. b) Der Polarismus beantwortet die Frage, indem er scharf zwischen natürlichen Symbolen und Sprachen einerseits und zwischen Symbolismus und Wirklichkeit anderseits unterscheidet . c) Der Pluralismus behandelt Bilder als ein Zwischending, das in der Mitte von Wirklichkeit Illusion der Wissen/Täuschung lokalisiert wird . 2) Das Vorkommen von institutionalisierter Täuschung , das Spiel, das darin besteht, falsche visuelle Hypothesen zu schaffedhaben ohne falsche intellektuelle Hypothesen zu machen untergraben die Position des Monismus und des Polarismus. Folglich ist 3.) der pluralistische Standpunkt wonach wir auf intellektueller Ebene durch den Gebrauch von Wahrnehmungstäuschung Information gewinnen, der vielversprechenste für die Erklärung, wie repräsentationale Bilder Information vermitteln. (shrink)

Susan Mills and John Beatty proposed a propensity interpretation of fitness (1979) to show that Darwinian explanations are not circular, but they did not address the critics' chief complaint that the principle of the survival of the fittest is either tautological or untestable. I show that the propensity interpretation cannot rescue the principle from the critics' charges. The critics, however, incorrectly assume that there is nothing more to Darwin's theory than the survival of the fittest. While Darwinians all scoff (...) at this assumption, they do not agree about what role, if any, this principle plays in Darwin's theory of natural selection. I argue that the principle has no place in Darwin's theory. His theory does include the idea that some organisms are fitter than others. But greater reproductive success is simply inferred from higher fitness. There is no reason to embody this inference in the form of a special principle of the survival of the fittest. (shrink)

Il y a vingt-cinq ans, j’étais un étudiant de doctorat intéressé par la philosophie d’Aristote et à la recherche d’un sujet de thèse. Au cours de mes études supérieures, j’ai eu la chance d’étudier l’Éthique à Nicomaque avec Rémi Brague et Les Politiques avec Judith Swanson. Ces deux érudits m’ont, à leur façon, fait prendre conscience de l’importance d’enquêter sur le public cible des œuvres d’Aristote. Tous deux parlaient en bien du livre Le philosophe et la cité (Les Belles Lettres, (...) 1982) de Richard Bodéüs, qui venait d’être traduit en anglais sous le titre The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics (State University of New York Press, 1993). Il se trouva qu’un jour de printemps, ayant été appelé à siéger comme juré, je pris avec moi mon tout nouvel exemplaire du volume de Bodéüs. Heureusement, le jury ne fut pas convoqué, mais on ne me laissa pas partir avant la fin de l’après-midi. Aussi passai-je toute la journée au palais de justice à lire l’ouvrage de Bodéüs et à réfléchir à la relation entre le concept de justice déployé dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et les analyses des constitutions qu’on trouve dans Les Politiques. Je découvris alors une réflexion savante, riche et profondément historique, portant sur la façon de comprendre les divers traités d’Aristote sur «la philosophie des choses humaines» (EN 10.9.1181b15). C’est ainsi que je fus mis sur la voie du sujet de sur lequel porterait ma thèse : la nature de la justice politique chez Aristote. C’est aussi ainsi que j’en vins à penser en compagnie de l’un des plus éminents spécialistes et traducteurs d’Aristote du siècle dernier. En 2018, la Northeast Political Science Association annonça que sa réunion annuelle allait se tenir à Montréal et invita ses membres à soumettre des contributions dans les deux langues officielles canadiennes. Étant donné que Montréal abrite également l’université dans laquelle Bodéüs avait enseigné, l’Université de Montréal, il m’est immédiatement venu à l’esprit de proposer un panel bilingue pour explorer la philosophie d’Aristote à la lumière de son ouvrage novateur, Le philosophe et la cité, qui fut déterminant pour mon parcours intellectuel. Deux panels furent constitués. Le premier rassemblait les participants anglophones : Jordan Jochim (Cornell University), Kevin Cherry (Richmond University) et moi-même (Quinnipiac University), et fut présidé par Jill Frank (Cornell University). Le second panel rassemblait les participants francophones : Léa Derome (Université McGill), Timothée Gautier (Université Paris 1 — Panthéon-Sorbonne), Louise Rodrigue (Collège universitaire dominicain), et fut présidé par Elsa Bouchard (Université de Montréal). Bodéüs, qui est à présent professeur émérite, accepta généreusement de lire toutes les contributions à l’avance et, combattant un mal de gorge le jour de la conférence, accompagna chacune d’entre elles de commentaires à la fois perspicaces et magnanimes. N’ayant pas pu inclure toutes les présentations de la conférence de novembre 2018, ce numéro de Dialogue comprend les versions révisées de trois contributions : mon “ὁμόνοια: The Hinge of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics?”, la contribution de Kevin Cherry, “Lawgivers, Virtue, and the Mixed Regime: Reflections on Richard Bodéüs’s The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics,” et celle de Louise Rodrigue, «La conception aristotélicienne de la servilité dans l’Éthique et la Politique». Nous remercions tout particulièrement Léa Derome, qui a édité cette tribune du livre, coordonné la soumission de nos documents et des réponses de Bodéüs à Dialogue, et a aidé à la traduction en français. Les trois articles présentés composent avec des interrogations héritées du travail du professeur Bodéüs. Nous sommes donc particulièrement reconnaissants qu’il ait accepté de contribuer à ce projet de publication. Nous espérons que l’ensemble parvienne à capturer ne serait-ce qu’un simulacre de l’expérience intellectuelle passionnante que fut notre journée de conférences de novembre 2018. (shrink)